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ABSTRACT 
 
Patrick Sung-Cuadrado: Parity in the Spanish healthcare system: An analysis of the 
policies of the Aznar and Zapatero governments of 1996-2008 
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens) 
 
 
 Disparity within the Spanish healthcare system has been prevalent since the 
inception of the democracy after the fall of Franco. This disparity has particularly 
affected the poorer regions of Spain, which did not have the resources or infrastructure of 
the wealthier regions, such as the Basque Country and Catalonia. This thesis sought to 
analyze the policies of the national-level governments of the Popular Party’s Jose Maria 
Aznar (1996-2000 and 2000-2004) and social democratic leader Jose Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero (2004-present). After research on the policies of the governments and collection 
of data on healthcare expenditure per capita at each time point (the status of the 
healthcare system in 1996 before the first Aznar government and at the end of each 
government’s term) in all regions of Spain, it was found that the PSOE government of 
Zapatero was more successful in promoting parity than the PP governments of Aznar. 
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A vehicle carrying a family of four travels home through the Spanish autonomous 
community of Pais Vasco (the Basque Country) at midnight on a rainy evening. The 
driver takes the turn as he normally does, but the water causes him to hydroplane into a 
tree. After being taken to one of the community’s hospitals, the family is placed in 
intensive care and, eventually, all survive. In a country with a system of universal 
healthcare, parity between regions should not only be a desire, but one of the three key 
goals of the Spanish state in terms of healthcare (in addition to up-to-date modernization 
of facilities and maximization of capabilities), however, this is currently not the status 
quo in the Spanish healthcare system. If this hypothetical situation were to occur in one 
of the poorer performing healthcare autonomous communities in Spain, such as the 
Baleares Islands, health and survival of said patients could very well be affected. 
 Disparity in the Spanish healthcare system has existed since the implementation 
of universal coverage with the passage of the General Health Law of 1986. Though 
lessened throughout the years with several legislative efforts, disparities remain in 
various autonomous communities. These disparities affect much of the populace of Spain 
and are a source of great concern for the Spanish government. Though decentralization 
has brought about much control on the regional level, national governmental legislation 
still affects regional healthcare. This analysis seeks to explore the degree to which 
national-level legislation positively affects institutional parity between regions in Spain in 
the field of healthcare with minor analysis of local “effort-based” parity-inducing 
measures. It is my assertion that national-level legislation affects community-level 
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healthcare to a significant degree; specifically, my hypothesis is that the social 
democratic Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 
(2004-present) has promoted more effective parity-inducing healthcare measures than the 
conservative Popular Party (PP) of Jose Maria Aznar (1996-2004). 
 First, the paper will aim to describe power resource theory as an explanation for 
both the historical disparities in the Spanish welfare state and the political movement of 
the government towards parity therein, specifically in terms of healthcare. The analysis 
will proceed to provide a historical account of healthcare in Spain and movement towards 
parity until the first Aznar government of 1996. It will provide a description of the 
healthcare system and its status in 1996 before Aznar comes to power, as to provide a 
starting point for analysis of the achievements of the governments under analysis. 
Legislative policy measures approved by the governments will then be detailed and their 
effects analyzed through two important healthcare effort measures: regional healthcare 
expenditure per capita and change in expenditure for each government. These will then 
be presented in table form at the end of each section. An analysis of the results will be 
performed at the end of the policy description sections and determine which of the two 
governments performed better. Finally, a brief speculative section discussing the result of 
the analysis and featuring a projection on the future of disparity in the country will 
conclude the paper. 
 The sources used for this paper are numerous. Peer-reviewed articles constitute 
many of the sources, as they will provide historical analysis of the healthcare system in 
Spain, a source for the power resources theory section of the paper and some further 
analysis of the parity-inducing effects of the legislative measures passed by the two 
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parties. Government databases and documents from the Ministry of Health and 
Consumption (MSC) will provide both the facts used for the outcomes at the time 
changes of the governments in each of the four case studies (1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008) 
and for the legislative measures approved during each of the legislative periods (1996-
2000, 2000-2004 and 2004-2008), as well as their content. A lecture on the history of 
Spain from the late 1700s until the democratic transition will be used for the historical 
account section. The legislative database 060.es will be used as well to reference some of 
the laws. Newspaper articles will be used for some legislative background. Finally, the 
Chapman (2005) thesis will be used as a source for other sources and some basic 
information about the history of the autonomous regions and financing of healthcare 
systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Power resources theory and historical progression of disparity in Spain’s welfare state 
 Reforms in governments and the welfare state are often described to arise through 
different means, or theories. One of the three most widely accepted theories is a “class-
analytic” (Stephens 1979) explanation of welfare state variation, or power resource 
theory. Supported by Korpi, Stephens and Esping-Andersen, PRT is valuable in 
describing the social beginnings of the movements and reforms in Spain and will be used 
in depth in this analysis. Developed in the late 1960s by Gerhardt Lenski, power resource 
theory described a phenomenon where the lower classes could unite and overcome the 
powerful elite in the state to “claim a larger share of the social surplus” (Myles and 
Quadagno 2002). However, difficulties arise in elections due to the fact that the wealthy 
are property owners and control much of the resources available. The solution to this 
obstacle lies in the organization of the lower class into unions and parties in a system of 
“universal suffrage and free and competitive elections” (Myles and Quadagno 2002), 
where they exercise their franchise to elect “explicitly class-based (i.e., labor) parties to 
represent their interests” (Hewitt 1977). 
 The theory, further developed by Walter Korpi, who formally labeled the theory 
by Lenski as the “power resource theory,” soon became the “dominant paradigm in the 
field” (Myles and Quadagno 2002). Korpi and others (Stephens 1979; Esping-Andersen 
1985; Myles 1984) began empirical studies on the theory and found that “major 
differences in welfare state spending and entitlements among the capitalist democracies 
could be explained by the relative success of left parties aligned with strong trade unions” 
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(Myles and Quadagno 2002). More recent research, such as that of Van Kersbergen in 
1995, finds that left parties and unions also generate high levels of social spending in 
center or right-controlled governments, such as social Catholicism and Christian 
Democratic governments. A problem arises in this explanation because social 
Catholicism and Christian Democratic parties are more readily willing to expend GDP on 
social services than liberal welfare states because of the Catholic tradition of eliminating 
poverty. However, it cannot be ignored that competition is created by left parties and 
unions that probably cause these centrist and center-right parties to concede more social 
services than they would prefer to fund or legalize, such as abortions and/or gay 
marriage. Broadly, power resource theory provides a good framework for researching the 
development of the welfare state in Spain, especially the healthcare system, of which will 
be the focus of this analysis. 
 The Spanish welfare state is classically defined as a Christian-democratic welfare 
state, but the history towards this classification is more complex than a simple 
relationship to the Catholic Church. Since the times of the Moors, Ferdinand and Isabella 
until the Constitution of 1812 (La Pepa), Spain had been ruled under monarchs. 
Establishing partial suffrage, freedom of print, industrial freedom, and abolishing the 
Inquisition, the Constitution of 1812, for the first time in Spanish history, had given the 
rural proletariat some basic rights. These rights lasted until 1820 when Ferdinand VII 
returns from his exile in France and imparts an absolute monarchy on Spain. Some 
liberties were renewed under Isabella II from 1833 until 1868, but civil war befell Spain 
that lasted from 1833 until 1876. During the last years of the Carlista Civil War from 
1873 until 1874, the First Republic was formed under the Constitution of 1869, which 
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established universal suffrage and freedom of the press in addition to the 
accomplishments of La Pepa. The First Republic was the first proletariat-run government 
in Spain in history, but this accomplishment for the lower classes was subjugated once 
again to a monarch, albeit the constitutional monarch, Alfonso XII, in 1875 (Amador 
Carretero 2008). 
 Within this time period, the working class of Spain was experiencing difficulties. 
Agriculture and industry were still under aristocratic rule and the workers had no rights 
and disparity was extremely prevalent in this time. In particular, agricultural workers in 
rural areas were cultivating aristocratic land in a situation akin to the sharecropping of the 
southern United States in the early to mid 20th century (Amador Carretero 2008). Two 
types of agricultural workers existed: jornaleros, whom were daily contracted laborers, 
and arrendatarios, whom were given land to live on and cultivate, but were given an 
insignificant portion of profits and were constantly in debt. Living conditions were 
atrocious and families suffered immensely, even with the newly given rights; as a result, 
workers began to organize in the mid 1870s (Amador Carretero 2008). Informal union 
meetings began occurring more frequently and, eventually, on May 2, 1879, the Spanish 
Socialist Worker’s Party was founded in Madrid with Pablo Iglesias as its designated 
party leader. In addition to PSOE, Young Socialists (Juventudes Socialistas) was founded 
in 1879 in Bilbao, the capital of the Basque Country. PSOE did not achieve any goals, let 
alone merit attention, until 1886 with the publication of the “El Socialista” (The Socialist) 
newsletter, which spread socialist ideas throughout the working class population of Spain 
(Amador Carretero 2008). Taking advantage of the growing organization and fervor 
developing in the worker population, Antonio Garcia Quejido founded the General 
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Worker’s Union (UGT) on August 12th, 1888. Generally known as the Worker’s 
Movement (1879-1908) and based primarily in the South and in Catalonia, the foundation 
of these three entities signaled the beginnings of proletariat organization (Amador 
Carretero 2008). 
 In this time period, specifically in 1883, the state, under Alfonso XII, created the 
Commission for Social Reforms (Comision de Reformas Sociales) to “investigate all 
questions that related to the benefit or welfare of the working class and that affected the 
relationship between Capital and Work” (MSC website 2008). PSOE and UGT pressured 
the Spanish crown with the need of care and support of workers who have been injured, 
and the monarchy relented in the form of the Law of Work Accidents of 1900 (Ley de 
Accidentes de Trabajo), which was the first social protection legislation in Spanish 
history. The Commission changed titles in 1903 to the Institute of Social Reforms 
(Instituto de Reformas Sociales) and in the next year was promptly given the charge to 
pass a comprehensive reform law after meeting with various officials in the Popular 
Forecast Conference held in October of 1904. Deciding better infrastructure was needed 
to handle the reform needed, they developed the model for the future National Forecast 
Institute (Instituto Nacional de Prevision, or INP), which was approved on February 27, 
1908. With the establishment of the Institute, worker pensions became a topic of great 
interest, eventually culminating in the passage of the Mandatory Retirement Insurance for 
Workers (Seguro Obligatorio del Retiro Obrero) on March 11 of 1919 (INGESA website 
2008). 
Monarchic rule was in place until the coup of 1923 by General Primo de Rivera, 
who remained in power in a dictatorship until 1930. During General Rivera’s rule, 
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however, two important parity-inducing legislative measures emerged in the form of 
maternity subsidies, such as loans, assistance during and after pregnancy. These measures 
could be seen as placation to the pressure from leftist organization, which was strong at 
this point in time. Upon the resignation of Primo de Rivera, General Dámaso Berenguer 
took power under what the Spanish called “dictablanda” (literally meaning ‘soft rule’). 
This form of governance is a play on the word for dictatorship in Spanish, “dictadura” 
(literally meaning ‘hard rule’). General Berenguer ruled under the title of dictator, but 
was very liberal in his allowances, eventually paving the way for the Second Republic in 
1931 (Amador Carretero 2008). Power resource theory can explain the allowance of 
General Berenguer to eventually found the Second Republic because immense pressure 
from the left began swelling after the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. During the Second 
Republic, another parity-inducing measure was passed, the Law of Accidents in Industry 
Work (Ley de Accidentes de Trabajo en la Industria) on July 4th, 1932, which brought 
about renewed hopes about the future of the Spanish welfare state (INGESA website 
2008). 
The power of the people, however, once again failed because of a coup, this time 
led by General Francisco Franco in 1936. The resulting Spanish Civil War from 1936 
until 1939, in which Franco claimed victory, crushed the morale of the working class, 
who backed the Republican army, and Spain entered the worst period of its history. Rural 
worker unions and parties were eliminated, usually by violent methods, such as forceful 
removal of teeth and nails of the union and party members. As a result, the fledgling 
PSOE had to go in exile to France in order to survive. This, in addition to violent 
repression of opponents, effectively eliminated any hope of leftist influence within the 
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country to strive for distribution of services and wealth (Amador Carretero 2008). A 
dictatorship ensued with the only influential people being the wealthy, aristocratic class 
that supported Franco. While the dictatorship could not be said to have been a welfare 
state model, Franco installed a pseudo-Christian democratic regime that benefited his 
supporters and punished the rural working class based on his fanatical views on 
Catholicism and the male breadwinner family in 1963 through the passage of the Basic 
Law of Social Security of 1963. This law provided social security for salaried workers 
(mostly, supporters of Franco), insignificant transfers to the extremely poor, a very 
marginal network of healthcare for salaried workers and heavy employment protection 
laws (Guillen 2006). 
As stated earlier, the historical roots for disparities in social classes grow until 
very recently and present a complicated yet fascinating background for the disparities 
existing in the Spain of today. While a worker’s movement, in the form of PSOE, was 
breeding within Spain in the latter parts of the 19th century, the arrival of Franco’s regime 
restrained progress towards parity in social circles and in social services. In the next 
section of the analysis, I will describe the historical account of healthcare in Spain until 
the first Aznar government in 1996, keeping in mind the historical roots of disparity 
within social networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Growth of the Spanish healthcare system 
 The current disparities in the Spanish welfare state are historically bound to the 
inequalities between the classes in the monarchic structure of the state since centuries 
ago. The lower classes had no representation or organization in government until the 
advent of PSOE and the other two labor organizations, UGT and the Young Socialists, in 
the latter half of the 19th century. These organizations represented proletariat interests and 
pressured the ruling class to make concessions, leading the way for the Second Republic 
of 1931. However, the arrival of Franco and the Spanish Civil War disrupted and, 
eventually, eradicated organization and brought about a regime representing the 
traditional ruling hierarchy of Spain’s history: absolute power in the hands of one figure 
(in this case, Generalisimo Franco) with a Catholic ideology shaping the traditions of the 
country. With this new regime in place, healthcare remained where it had always been: 
either a part of the life of the lower classes with traditional cures or hospitals in larger 
city centers, which only the aristocratic could access. I believe that Franco’s strong 
Catholic beliefs, however, formed a pseudo form of the Christian Democratic state of the 
modern era that initiated the healthcare system in Spain and other social transfers. 
Although these transfers mainly benefited Franco’s supporters, they provided a 
foundation for the growth of the Spanish healthcare system into the future democracy and 
into the 21st century. 
 Franco began his reign in 1939 by removing any opposition in his attempts to 
consolidate power. Through the methodical brutality that ensued, most public vestiges of 
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leftist thinking within Spain were eliminated and forced into exile in France. With the 
state completely under his control, Franco needed a system of basic coverage of 
healthcare for new workers, mostly, presumably, for his supporters. On December 14th of 
1942, Franco developed the Mandatory Sickness Insurance, or the Seguro Obligatorio de 
Enfermedad (SOE), a rudimentary healthcare system designed for his workers to be 
covered in case of sickness (Rodriguez et al. 2000). The program was financed 
exclusively through social security contributions and was intended primarily for coverage 
of “industrial workers and their dependants” (Rodriguez et al. 2000), however, it also 
sought protection for the extremely poor, whose salaries did not surpass the designated 
limits (INGESA website 2008). Benefits included medical assistance in case of sickness 
or maternity and economic compensation for the previously stated reasons (INGESA 
website 2008). The program is placed under INP responsibility upon its inception and 
compulsory coverage was soon extended to other labor groups, including “miners, 
seamen, landowners and agricultural workers” (Rodriguez et al. 2000). The program was 
extended to civil servants later on in Franco’s rule, but included “special interesting 
features” for civil workers, amounting to extra benefits (Rodriguez et al. 2000). 
 On December 28th, 1963, Franco’s government approved the Law of Social 
Security Bases (Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social) that replaced older systems of 
social security and replaced them with the current system in place (INGESA website 
2008). During this time, Franco began to be faced with increasing pressure from within 
the country from laborers and outside the country by leaders and PSOE, which was 
located in France during Franco’s reign. Concessions, such as the social security reform 
and the opening of the country in the late 1960s, were a direct result of pressure from 
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these entities. After the death of Franco and during the democratic transition (of which 
will not be explored in this analysis), the Ministry of Health and Social Security (the 
predecessor of the Ministry of Health and Consumption, or MSC) was founded in 1977 
on July 4th (INGESA website 2008). In 1979, the newly formed democracy approved the 
creation of the National Health Institute (Instituto Nacional de Salud, or INSALUD), 
which handled everything related to health within the Spanish social transfer system 
(INGESA website 2008). At this time, in the early 1980s, SOE transferred under 
INSALUD oversight and covered, after various extensions in coverage (the last 
significant addition being the self-employed in 1984), 83% of the population under public 
provision (Rodriguez et al. 2000). 
 The Spanish healthcare system in the early 1980s was firmly established and 
covered a large majority of the country. The disparity between the elite and the proletariat 
was decreasing and healthcare was at the forefront of the change. However, sentiments 
began going through the country about making certain social transfers, such as education 
and healthcare, at least partial concerns of the State. Thus, on April 14th of 1986, the 
Congress of Diplomats, led by the socialist PSOE, approved the General Law of Health 
(Ley General de Sanidad), eliminating the social security funded healthcare system and 
creating a National Health Service provided by the State (INGESA website 2008). The 
goals of this new conception and construction of the healthcare system in Spain were to 
increase the coverage rate from 83% to universal, shift finances for the system to a 
partially tax-driven system and to eventually devolve the healthcare sector from a 
INSALUD responsibility to a autonomous community responsibility by first establishing 
administrative centers in each region, which would eventually be given fiscal expenditure 
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freedom from the central government in Madrid (Rodriguez et al. 2008). The First 
General Budget Law changed healthcare financing in December of 1989 from a system 
primarily funded by social security payments (80% from employers and 20% from 
employees), representing roughly “75% of total public health financing while transfers 
from the State’s tax revenues made up for the rest” (Rodriguez et al. 2000) to a system 
where the inverse occurred: tax revenue constituted 72% of healthcare financing with 
social security accounting for the rest (Rodriguez et al. 2000). Gradually, throughout the 
next ten years, financing was provided exclusively through the State’s tax revenues, but 
this will be explored later in the section of Aznar’s first government. 
 The inception of the National Health Service in 1986 was a landmark 
accomplishment by leftist groups, who through years of pressure and protest during the 
Franco regime finally became the leading party of the government in the 1980s. Before 
that time, national healthcare spending was extremely low in the middle part of the 
regime: 37.283 million equivalent euros (labeled EE for the rest of the analysis) for 
roughly 30.529 million inhabitants representing a per capita spending figure of 1.22 EE 
per inhabitant (MSC 2006a). Growth of healthcare spending in the latter part of the 
regime grew exponentially due to the corresponding economic boom of the 1970s: for 
example, in 1970, spending grew to 383.693 million EE for 33.956 million inhabitants 
representing a figure of 11.30 EE per inhabitant, and in 1975 (when the regime ended), 
spending grew to 1.373 billion EE for 35.849 million inhabitants resulting in a figure of 
38.30 EE per inhabitant (MSC 2006a). By 1986, healthcare spending grew to 8.720 
billion EE for 38.800 million inhabitants, or 224.74 EE per inhabitant (MSC 2006a), 
marking the beginning of large-scale healthcare spending in Spain.  
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 After the advent of the NHS, funding for the various autonomous communities 
became an important issue, especially with the future plans of fiscal decentralization on 
the horizon. From 1986 until 1993, the Congress of Diplomats (Parliament) began 
analyzing various methods of determining how much funding each community would 
receive. Negotiations were difficult due to nationalist party interests wanting to keep the 
status quo and the socialist desire to form criteria based primarily on regional need, but 
socialist diplomats eventually ceded to nationalist interests that assured that no region 
would receive less than it previously received and also ensuring continued disparity in 
funding (Garcia-Mila 2003). However, this funding scheme did not provide the low-
performing regions with more money and maintained the pre-existing disparities between 
regions (Garcia-Mila 2003). One last reform added before the Aznar government in 1996 
and approved by the social democratic PSOE party, led by Felipe Gonzalez, was the 
passage of a new financial distribution formula that changed funding to a 
“demographically based scheme” (Chapman 2005). The next section seeks to analyze the 
politics of the Aznar administration and will track the progress of these four autonomous 
communities through regional GDP per capita spent on healthcare and two other 
healthcare effort measures that will be described briefly at the beginning of the next 
section. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The politics of equity and parity in healthcare of the first Aznar administration (1996-
2000) 
The data presented in this analysis is comprehensive. It contains information on 
each of the seventeen autonomous communities of Spain, is organized (from top to 
bottom) by the wealthiest regions to the poorest regions in average GDP per capita in 
1996 and involves two measures, which will further be explained below. This 
comprehensive data set is being used to present the best possible picture of the Spanish 
healthcare system at the four time points (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008) to allow for better 
analysis of the three governments and their effects on parity in the healthcare system. The 
variables being used to analyze each autonomous community and their healthcare are 
“effort-based.” These variables are healthcare expenditure per capita and change in 
expenditure. The motivation for choosing an effort-based variable is that this paper aims 
only to analyze the effects of legislation on removing institutional disparity between 
regions. Also, many commonly used variables for measuring healthcare parity, such as 
morbidity, mortality and life expectancy, have other influencing factors that have little 
correlation with institutional parity, which can not be explored in depth in a paper of this 
concise length. 
The Spanish NHS, as we have seen, is the culmination of much effort, time and 
impetus from proletariat organizations, such as UGT and the political party, PSOE, which 
was governing from the early 1980s until 1996. In 1996, the Popular Party came to power 
in a coalition government with regional nationalist parties, such as CiU and PNV, on a 
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platform of largely economic issues, which were plaguing the country. At this time, the 
state of the healthcare system was varied depending on which of the autonomous 
communities one analyzed. On the following tables, certain terminology must be defined 
for best understanding the data. By underperformance, I mean to indicate that the 
expenditure level of an autonomous community is lower than the national average. 
Correspondingly, an over performing region is one that spent higher than the national 
average on healthcare per capita. 
What the figures on table 1 suggest is an interesting situation. At this point in 
Spanish history, the numbers indicate that only two of the wealthiest eight regions 
underperformed in healthcare expenditure, including the wealthiest region in GDP per 
capita, the Balearic Islands. Meanwhile, five of the nine poorest regions underperformed. 
This pattern supports the historical tradition of the Southern regions being of the poor, 
working proletariat and the Northern regions being wealthy and having access to more 
resources in healthcare. A noteworthy observation is that with the establishment of the 
NHS ten years prior to these measures and constant social democratic rule during that 
tenure, one would be surprised that the disparity is so high at the beginning of the Aznar 
government. However, this is without analyzing prior benchmarks that could indicate 
social democratic success in this field, but the lack of statistical data prior to 1995 in this 
field does not allow for this study. Needless to say, the Aznar government was presented 
with a difficult challenge during its first term in power until 2000. 
The Aznar government assumed control of the government in summer of 1996 and 
began initiatives to reform the previously lagging economy of Spain, which allowed for their 
successful election. However, the Popular Party also came into power with a political 
platform  that  stressed  the  improvement  of  “quality  in  public  health  services,  increase  
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Table 1 
 
Regional statistics in 1996 
 
Regional expenditure on 
healthcare per capita 
(euros) 
Balearic Islands 485.50 
Madrid 590.24 
Catalonia 592.78 
Navarre 743.71 
Basque Country 654.41 
La Rioja 544.83 
Aragon 607.23 
Cantabria 615.96 
Valencia 549.55 
Castile-Leon 568.28 
Canary Islands 604.30 
Asturias 595.40 
Murcia 543.45 
Castile-La Mancha 534.83 
Galicia 581.33 
Andalusia 573.47 
Extremadura 591.00 
Spain 580.39 
Source: Author’s calculations, MSC 2006, INE website 2008 
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customer satisfaction and to improve overall efficiency” (Lopez-Casasnovas 1998). Stated 
preliminary reform proposals included “a purchaser/provider split; greater autonomy for 
health centers and hospitals; more efficient management at all levels of the health system; 
[and] a more equitable distribution of resources to correct territorial inequities” (Lopez-
Casasnovas 1998). According to the MSC annual health report of 2003, close to 40% of 
Spaniards in 1995 felt that the healthcare system needed “fundamental” changes or a 
complete overhaul. With this significant percentage of Spaniards believing that the 
healthcare system needed large reforms in the mid 1990s, the Popular Party and Aznar took 
action in their second year in office. In 1997, the Popular Party approved several new 
legislative measures in an attempt to improve the healthcare system through several means. 
The first was a tax measure, which increased community ceded taxes, such as income tax, 
the value added tax and certain product taxes (alcohol, tobacco, etc.), to allow a greater 
revenue stream for non-foral autonomous communities (those communities that did not 
have much revenue authority) (Puig-Junoy and Rovira 2004). This could be said to increase 
autonomy within the regions and allow, perhaps, better management of funding or additional 
funding for services or infrastructure, not only in healthcare, but in other sectors of the 
community, where ceded taxes constituted 10% of regional income (Puig-Junoy and Rovira 
2004). The increase of revenue authority to the communities was a prudent decision because 
individual autonomies would understand their budgetary needs more than on the national 
level and this supplemental revenue stream would aid in accomplishing the actual need. 
Later, this measure was further reformed to increase the ceded taxes to a further extent in 
2002, but will be explored later in the next section as it occurred in the majority Aznar 
government. 
A second legislative action approved by the Aznar government was a restrictive 
budgetary measure to prevent healthcare budget increases. Before the restrictive policy, 
preliminary community health budgets would be increased without approval when 
“effective pharmaceutical expenditure (and other minor expenses) exceeded the initial 
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budget” (Puig-Junoy and Rovira 2004). This practice typically led to underbudgeting by 
parliament due to the public sector of the communities “circumventing financial 
restrictions” and using this loophole in the law to finance programs, doctors and other costs 
for the regional healthcare system (Puig-Junoy and Rovira 2004). However, the passage of 
the measure from Aznar’s government closed this financial loophole and prevented the 
increase of certain budgetary measures without decreasing another budgetary need by the 
same amount of the increase, thereby saving large amounts of money on the national level 
(Puig-Junoy and Rovira 2004). This reform caused a great deal of controversy within labor 
unions, especially the healthcare worker union, due to other sections of the reform that dealt 
with the organizational model of administrative healthcare workers. The additional reforms 
of the measure allowed administrative officials of primary care clinics to “allow centers to 
be run under other than public social security rules” (Lopez-Casasnovas 1998). The 
healthcare worker unions and leftist parties (social democratic PSOE and communist IU) 
complained that these measures undermined their collective bargaining agreements and, 
possibly, quality of service by allowing private insurers to “partially take on a larger role in 
the delivery of health care to the population” (Lopez-Casasnovas 1998). 
A third legislative measure action taken by the Aznar government was the 
establishment of a national financial audit of the healthcare sector to “calculate the pending 
debt of the system” (due to frequent overrunning of community budgets) and to “eliminate 
this debt and formulate a realistic method of financing public health care in Spain” (Lopez-
Casasnovas 1998). An audit of infrastructure, technology and personnel was also performed 
for the purpose of future modernization of facilities and resources for two reasons: a) to 
assure the most up-to-date equipment for Spain’s healthcare system in the future for the 
end of better performance in supposed outcomes, such as infant mortality and life 
expectancy and b) to be able to later promote parity within and between autonomous 
communities by renovating infrastructure and providing more personnel to underserved 
areas.  
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Once these three legislative reforms had been passed, particularly the third, a familiar 
challenge to the central government arose. Upon the completion of the financial audit of the 
healthcare system, the historical problem of distribution of funding to each autonomous 
community (briefly mentioned earlier in the paper) arose and arguments occurred between 
the opposition left and the ruling right on how to distribute provisions in an equitable 
manner between autonomous regions. After much debate within the Fiscal and Finance 
Politics Committee (Consejo de Politica Fiscal y Financiera), consensus finally arrived in 
November of 1997 with the establishment and founding of the General Fund for Territorial 
Distribution and two other smaller funds (the Compensatory Fund and the Fund for Cross 
boundary Flow of patients). The General Fund constituted 98.5% of total funding and was 
given out on a per capita basis to each individual region, for example, Andalusia received 
18.07% of the fund and Catalonia received 15.75% (Lopez-Casasnovas 1998). The other 
two funds, meanwhile, were created to “compensate those communities which could argue 
for an unfair treatment under the pure capitation system” (Lopez-Casasnovas 1998). The 
result is a “very complex strategy” that Lopez-Casasnovas deems absent of any “real 
reform.”  
The most significant problem with the entire financial aspect of the healthcare 
system was the search for funding for the ambitious spending of the government in their 
modernization projects. The audit revealed the significant public deficit that had accumulated 
due to overrunning of the budgets and that future planned transfer payments from the 
central government to the regional governments exceeded projected spending allotment for 
healthcare by 1.9 billion euros. The fiscal year of 1998 was the result, with the 1.9 billion 
euros being raised from various sources: 1.2 billion euros of additional funding from the 
central government general budget, 452 million euros from raised tax revenues and 248 
million euros coming from “fighting fraud in sick day leave” (Lopez-Casasnovas 1998). 
With these reforms, the Spanish healthcare system began cutting extraneous costs. Even 
with increased effort at raising budgetary measures to provide additional funding for various 
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projects at the regional level, the ambitious plans of the 1996 Popular Party platform to 
reduce inequity were not realized. Focus then shifted, as Puig-Junoy and Rovira (2004) 
indicate, from parity in access, infrastructure and quality to “cost-containment.”  
The goal of cost-containment changed in the last full year of the first minority Aznar 
government with the passage of the legislative reform changing the structure of health 
financing. As described earlier, the General Budget Law of 1989 dictated that eventually 
healthcare be solely financed through tax, and the culmination was the 1999 law 
fundamentally that changed the funding system from a hybrid social security-tax finance 
system, where social security financed 28% and tax financed 72%, to exclusively tax driven 
(Rodriguez et al. 2000). Motivations behind the bill were that “unlike old age pensions, the 
amount of health services received is unrelated with the amount of contributions paid,” so it 
is a sound decision to finance healthcare through taxes (Rodriguez et al. 2000), however, 
some experts argue that the motivation was to move healthcare out of a future social security 
crisis (Lopez-Casasnovas 1998). One other aspect of the reform in 1999 was the clause that 
changed the tax relief scheme. Until 1999, all private health care expenditures, even if 
funded by public transfers, led to a 15% tax relief reflected in a user’s personal income tax, 
which has merely proven to be a “regressive fiscal expenditure” (Lopez-Casasnovas, 
Costa-Font and Planas 2005). The hope with this measure was to see if subsidized private 
healthcare consumption resulted in lower public healthcare consumption, however, the 
evidence of whether or not this actually occurred is lacking and the debate continues. Since 
2000, the only subsidized private care that was tax deductible were “private health care 
[expenditures] financed by insurance premiums paid by firms (from corporate income 
tax)” (Lopez-Casasnovas, Costa-Font and Planas 2005). This was a significant contraction 
of the previous tax law, which now excluded private coverage sought by individuals through 
public funds 
The policy measures enacted by the Popular Party and Aznar during his first term in 
office were very optimistic in terms of goals in their party platform at the beginning of their 
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tenure. The problem that arises out of the policies enacted by the Aznar government strayed 
from the end goal of equity and parity then settled for cost cutting measures (Puig-Junoy 
and Rovira 2004). While the Popular Party is traditionally credited with steering Spain to 
economic prosperity in their eight years in office, these first four years of policies only 
serve to further their image as willing to sacrifice equality throughout society for the 
interests of the wealthy. In terms of legislative effort seeking parity, the minority Aznar 
government performs quite poorly. However, it is necessary to look at the growth results of 
the sample communities to see any effect the policies could have had, or how to explain 
growth in sectors if they do not correlate directly with legislative measures.  
When comparison of 1996 and 2000 occurs, several interesting trends can be 
observed. First, table 2 indicates that of the top eight wealthiest regions, two regions remain 
underperformers, but Madrid is a newcomer, while La Rioja expands spending by an 
incredible 37.91% to rise above the national average, leaving the Balearic Islands as the sole 
underperformer from 1996 from the wealthiest regions, despite its status as the wealthiest 
region in GDP per capita in 1996. Additionally, five of the nine poorest regions 
underperformed, which is the same as in 1996. However, four of the eight wealthiest regions 
underperformed in change in expenditure, with only two of the poorer nine regions 
underperforming in this measure. This indicates that the government did promote some 
parity, however disparity is still prevalent in the actual figure of healthcare expenditure per 
capita. Therefore, there is no indication, from these numbers, that the policies of the first 
Aznar government had much effect on parity. On the contrary, the legislative policies 
enacted contain no language that strongly supports the argument that this data is the result 
of the policies of Aznar. More analysis will be performed in the results/discussion section, 
as we move to the policies of the majority Aznar government of 2000-2004. 
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Table 2 
 
Regional 
statistics in 
2000 
 
Regional 
expenditure on 
healthcare per 
capita (euros) 
 
% change 
1996-2000 
Balearic 
Islands 609.06 25.45 
Madrid 690.44 
 
16.98 
 
Catalonia 756.22 27.57 
Navarre 910.32 22.40 
Basque 
Country 831.15 27.01 
La Rioja 751.38 37.91 
Aragon 769.07 26.65 
Cantabria 799.56 29.63 
Valencia 685.51 24.74 
Castile-Leon 732.77 28.95 
Canary 
Islands 790.62 30.83 
Asturias 774.57 30.09 
Murcia 715.23 31.61 
Castile-La 
Mancha 683.17 27.74 
Galicia 744.17 28.01 
Andalusia 694.26 21.06 
Extremadura 754.89 27.73 
Spain 736.84 26.96 
Source: Author’s calculations, MSC 2006, INE website 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
The politics of equity and parity in the healthcare system by the second Aznar 
government (2000-2004) 
 The previous Aznar administration performed extraordinarily well economically 
in their first term in office, and while their healthcare reforms did not actively promote 
parity, some of the autonomous communities in this study did improve levels of parity. 
Due to the success of the party in their first term in office, the Spanish populace reelected 
Aznar and the Popular Party to power again in 2000, but this time with an absolute 
majority in parliament. With no need to pander to nationalist parties and form coalitions, 
the Popular Party set out to pass reforms that they truly desired. As we will see in this 
section, this included several healthcare reforms. 
 During the first year of the Aznar majority government, no healthcare reforms 
were passed due to other priorities on the party platform. However, an important measure 
was passed on the 27th of December in 2001 with Law 21/2001, which devolved 
healthcare management exclusively to the autonomous communities, which had not 
already received those administrative powers (Andalusia, Catalonia, Navarre, the Basque 
Country, Galicia, etc.) (Miragaya 2004). The motivation behind this reform was simple: 
politicians wanted to allow the communities to formulate their own strategic plans; the 
extreme difficulty in national planning for each of the various communities was reflected 
in constant debate in parliament over what was the best course of action for each region 
(Miragaya 2004). This legislative measure was the most prudent decision for the 
government because it is logical that Extremadura would be able to determine what is the 
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best or most efficient reform to approve for Extremadura, as well as every other 
autonomous community that was not already included in the pre-2001 decentralization 
process. The law also included a fiscal aspect, which was divided into two equally 
significant parts.  
The first of these fiscal aspects was the devolution of healthcare financing from 
State taxes to the budgets of the various autonomous communities. For this end, the 
aforementioned extension to the ceded tax law came into effect; the ceded law reform 
now fully transferred some authority over several taxes, whereas the 1997 law transferred 
the revenue to the communities. Autonomous communities began to have control over 
33% of the income tax of their residents, 40% of some consumption taxes (alcohol, 
tobacco, petrol, etc.) of the products sold in their region and 35% of the VAT in their 
region (Puig-Junoy and Rovira 2004). It is important to note that this measure is 
questionable in its parity-promoting effects. The movement towards more regional 
control over funding, on first glance, appears to be positive. Regional governments know 
more about their needs, so they would be able to address their needs more effectively 
through spending in areas of weakness. However, the practice is inegalitarian because 
poorer regions would make less revenue from taxes than more wealthy regions, simply 
based on higher wages in the wealthier communities. This implies that poorer 
autonomous communities would have less funding to spend on programs and 
infrastructure than wealthier communities and that the policy measure would, in fact, 
amplify previous disparity, rather than promote parity. 
The second fiscal reform of the 2001 policy measure was a limit on regional 
spending. This aspect appeared to have been reminiscent of the previous administration’s 
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cost-cutting measures with the raising healthcare expenditures only being approved if the 
community could provide the funding in some other method, such as budget cuts from 
other sectors (education, for example), community-level tax increases or from regional 
growth in GDP larger than the percentage of Spain’s growth (Puig-Junoy and Rovira 
2004). In addition to these reforms, the Aznar government passed the General Law of 
Budgetary Stability that demanded of governments a “zero deficit rule” (Chapman 2005). 
According to Garcia-Mila (2003), criticism arose throughout the country, especially from 
PSOE and the healthcare sector, which indicated that healthcare had historically been 
underfinanced in Spain and every community now had a tremendous deficit from all of 
the previous borrowing. The widespread deficits now prevented communities from 
spending as much as planned and slowed developments of infrastructure and programs to 
promote parity throughout and between regions. 
The following year, when most of these reforms officially began, the Aznar 
government made an addendum to Law 7/2001 with Law 53/2002 that assigned 
minimum expenditure figures for each autonomous community. The motivation for this 
law was to ensure that a certain percentage of Spanish GDP was going to the healthcare 
system. However, in retrospect, this minimum guideline seemed unnecessary as spending 
far exceeded these minimum guidelines. For example, Andalusia spent 765 million euros 
(14.19%) more than was asked in 2003, while Catalonia and Extremadura spent 796 
(16.58%) and 163 million euros (19.40%) more, respectively; however, the most 
overspending region was Madrid, which spent 1.5 billion euros (51.07%) more than the 
so-called “minimum expenditure” level (Miragaya 2004). In total, the spending guideline 
was exceeded by 5.38 billion euros (19.34%) (Miragaya 2004). Another minor legislative 
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policy approved on August 2nd, 2002 was Royal Decree 840/2002, which changed 
INSALUD to INGESA (National Institute of Health Matters). The change could be aptly 
described as part-cosmetic and part-structural due to the dual nature of the law: cosmetic 
because the name change did not affect the workings of the institution, yet structural 
because it assigned the management of expenditures of the autonomous cities Ceuta and 
Melilla (Miragaya 2004). One last change in 2002 was legislation creating a Cohesion 
Fund, which would allow for the compensation of one community’s resident going to 
another community and receiving healthcare there and for foreign European residents 
receiving care within Spain (Miragaya 2004). This fund, financed by the government’s 
central budget, allows flexibility for residents who in certain instances need to go to 
another community to receive adequate care. However, this fund does not appear to 
promote parity because of its adaptation to the problem of healthcare disparity between 
regions, rather than seeking to solve the problem. 
Perhaps the most significant law passed during both Aznar administrations was 
Law 16/2003, approved on May 28th for the cohesion and quality of the NHS. Among the 
stated goals of the law at the beginning of the legislation were to limit waiting lists for 
uses of the system in the communities for quality and the have “equal conditions and 
guarantees to patients sent to other Autonomous Communities for treatment” (Miragaya 
2004). In the first chapter of legislation, entitled “Transfers of the NHS,” recognition to 
the rights and guarantees to citizens of accessibility, movement, information, quality and 
security and a guarantee that the Interterritorial Council of the NHS (CISNS) would 
approve guidelines for waiting lists (Miragaya 2004). Chapter three, entitled 
“Professionals,” creates a Human Resources Commission (HRC) that would participate 
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in both the State and community-level administrations and would dictate criteria for the 
movement and placement of healthcare professionals in certain autonomous communities 
(the criteria were later passed in November of 2003 with Law 44/2003 and Law 55/2003, 
which dictated coordination methods to facilitate ease of movement) (Miragaya 2004). 
Chapter six, entitled “Quality,” dictates that yearly plans of quality will be handled by 
CISNS; allows yearly audits by public institutions or private companies of the quality and 
safety of NHS centers and health services; creates the Agency of NHS Quality that would 
be responsible for development and maintenance of the quality of facilities in 
communities; creates the NHS Observatory, which would constantly be assessing the 
quality of the NHS and was approved, along with the Agency of NHS Quality, with 
Royal Decree 1087/2003 (Miragaya 2004). Finally, in the second final disposition, the 
creation of inter-ministry council that would investigate potentially disparity-inducing 
fiscal matters for the NHS and report to CISNS and the Fiscal Policy Council (Miragaya 
2004). 
As observed, the last piece of major healthcare legislation by the Aznar 
government was extremely ambitious in its effort for inter-regional healthcare parity. 
Chapter one represented mostly symbolic gestures as reassurances to the Spanish people 
that their concerns were being addressed with this piece of legislation. Chapter three 
begins two significant reforms that are pertinent to parity: the creation of the HRC and 
the criteria to dictate methods for the placement and movement of medical professionals 
is extremely useful for parity. If the government dictates where recent doctors have to go, 
then parity could be rapidly promoted within a region, if the infrastructure is there in the 
form of clinics and hospitals. Chapter six further promotes parity by creating a system of 
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frequent checks and balances of quality of facilities and of infrastructure, while also 
creating an agency that is responsible for the creation of more State and regional 
infrastructures and the maintenance of it. This section creates a synergy with chapter 
three by providing the infrastructure needed in underserved areas that can be filled by the 
doctors that the central and community governments distribute. The final legislative 
measure of the law creates the inter-ministry council that would investigate and research 
possible disparities in funding in the NHS throughout the country, which helps 
immensely by providing funding for infrastructure, personnel, technology, medicines and 
other services that could promote equity between regions. 
The majority Aznar government of 2000-2004 certainly passed more effort-based 
parity-inducing legislation than the previous Aznar government. Solely off the merits of 
Law 16/2003, this government was far more successful than the first term government 
but, in addition, the majority Aznar government passed legislation decentralizing the 
healthcare system, allowing the communities to decide the best individual course of 
action for their region, as well as extending them partial control of ceded taxes. However, 
not all the legislation was positive for parity. The fiscal “cost-cutting” measures in 2001 
(particularly the zero deficit rule) constrained regional governments in their healthcare 
spending, unless they could find the means, which did not indicate disparity in social 
democratic PSOE-run communities, such as Andalusia, which would just raise taxes to 
meet the demand. However, in the Popular Party run communities, such as the Balearic 
Islands, this implied disparity-promoting policy due to the PP’s reluctance to raise taxes, 
especially on the wealthy. Also, the Cohesion Fund, while designed to allow patients 
access to other areas, possibly promotes keeping the status quo causing a client to move 
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from a high-performing region, such as Extremadura, to a low-performing region, such as 
Andalusia, because the smaller Extremadura did not have technologically advanced 
equipment available for use like the larger Andalusia might possess. Finally, the 
devolution of healthcare responsibilities might not be as effective as previously thought 
by Spanish politicians. While the logic of a region understanding what needs it has better 
than the central government is sound, according to research by Chapman (2005), Puig-
Junoy and Rovira (2004) and the opinion of Spanish citizens (more than 50% of whom 
see differences between urban and rural areas), decentralization had not necessarily 
promoted equity between Spaniards by 2004, rather it still had fiscal responsibility 
deficiencies (Puig-Junoy and Rovira 2004) and highlighted, or even further entrenched, 
certain “socioeconomic inequalities and differences in political ideology, administrative 
capacity and revenue generating ability” (Chapman 2005). 
Analysis of the numbers may support that Aznar’s government did well in 
promoting parity during their second tenure in office. The trends seen in the table indicate 
several things. The growth in healthcare expenditure per capita increased by 33.28%, 
which is larger than the change of the first Aznar government. However, of the eight 
wealthier regions,  three  were  now  underperforming (compared to two in 2000). Of the 
eight autonomous communities posting below average expenditure, five were of the nine 
poorer  regions,  including  three  of  the  bottom  four  (Castile-La  Mancha,  Galicia  and 
Andalusia). Galicia, in fact, had not been underperforming in healthcare expenditure per 
capita since the last Felipe Gonzalez PSOE government lost the elections in 1996. While 
the Aznar government once again displayed increased bottom-over-top-level spending 
(four of the wealthiest eight regions  underperformed in change in expenditure  compared  
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Table 3 
 
Regional 
Statistics in 
2004 
 
 
Regional 
expenditure on 
healthcare per 
capita 
(euros) 
 
 
% change 
2000-2004 
Balearic 
Islands 914.40 50.13 
Madrid 877.15 27.04 
Catalonia 971.35 28.45 
Navarre 1,123.88 23.46 
Basque 
Country 1,091.65 31.34 
La Rioja 1,061.92 41.33 
Aragon 1,036.10 34.72 
Cantabria 1,177.31 47.24 
Valencia 924.30 34.83 
Castile-Leon 974.82 33.03 
Canary Islands 1,083.93 37.10 
Asturias 1,084.47 40.01 
Murcia 993.38 38.89 
Castile-La 
Mancha 914.04 33.79 
Galicia 967.26 29.98 
Andalusia 921.93 32.79 
Extremadura 1,085.27 43.77 
Spain 982.06 33.28 
Source: Author’s calculations, MSC 2006, INE website 2008 
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to three in the poorer nine regions), the case of Galicia and the fact that three of the 
poorest   four   regions  in  Spain  were   now  underperforming  indicate  that  the  Aznar 
government did not promote parity effectively during their second term. 
What we have seen in the second Aznar government is more legislation that 
appears to have increasingly focused on social changes to the healthcare system rather 
than the fiscal cost cutting that marked the first administration. What the data shows, 
however, is that the policies of the second Aznar government were extremely ineffective 
in reducing disparity between the wealthiest and the poorest of regions. While it is 
evident that the Aznar government generally performed poorly in both terms of 
governance, we must analyze the policies of the Zapatero government and continue to 
monitor the progress of the case communities through 2004-2008 before a resolution on 
the thesis may be concluded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The politics of equity and parity in the healthcare system in the Zapatero government 
of 2004-2008 
 With the surprise victory of the PSOE in the 2004 elections, Jose Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero became president, promising progressive social policies in various sectors, 
especially attention to the healthcare sector. The social democratic platform did not 
appear to appeal to Spaniards particularly well, especially considering the success of the 
Popular Party in their two terms. However, with growing discontent about the Iraq War 
and the occurrence of the March 11th bombings in Madrid, voter turnout was the highest 
in the history of the democracy and the social democrats won. As a result, what we see 
over the course of the following four years is a series of very progressive social 
healthcare policies with few types of the measures of the previous administration, which 
is to be expected from a transition of a Christian democratic ruling party to a social 
democratic ruling party.  
 The first policy of the Zapatero government was one such progressive social 
policy was Royal Decree 2132/2004 concerning stem cells and their usage and funding 
on October 29th, 2004. The second law of the PSOE government, however, provides 
supposed parity-inducing legislation in the form of Royal Decree 2198/2004. This decree 
modifies the Cohesion Fund, created by the Popular Party in their second term and 
modified by the significant Law 16/2003, by adding two important clauses. The first 
clause states that the State should distribute funding to finance tobacco prevention 
programs to the autonomous communities to lower tobacco usage, particularly amongst 
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healthcare professionals and educators (060.es 2004). The second clause covers the 
diabetes problem in Spain and seeks to provide funding to the communities for primary 
prevention programs and assistance to diabetic patients (060.es 2004). This program, 
while not creating parity between states, improves the quality of healthcare within the 
country and, due to its distribution to the regions needing the funding the most, does 
promote parity in the state of health of its citizens. 
 One of the campaign promises that the PSOE made during election season was a 
promise to provide every autonomous community with a “major injection of funding” 
(Chapman 2005), due to the widespread prevalence of healthcare deficits. The Zapatero 
government asked each autonomous community to partially become responsible for the 
healthcare debt, but the regions governed by the Popular Party showed restraint in 
accepting the proposal by the government (El Pais Sept. 1st, 2005). This result of the PP-
controlled rejecting calls from the central government to accept the burden of part of the 
debt reflected sentiments of the Zapatero administration, which stated that if citizens 
want more funding or elimination of debt in their region, they must make better political 
choices (El Pais Aug. 24th, 2005). This is true in the sense that PP-controlled 
governments provide more tax breaks to the wealthy and, as a result, have less money for 
social transfers, while PSOE-controlled governments show ready willingness to increase 
taxes for the end of social programs.  
As a result, the government proposed a direct transfer of 500 million euros and 
1.2 billion more in various funds from the central government’s budget and increases on 
tobacco, alcohol, gas and electricity as both a way to curb usage of these goods and to 
help finance the system debt (El Pais Sept. 1st, 2005). Although financial responsibility of 
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the healthcare budget had been passed to the community level, the government 
announced its willingness to cover half of the regional healthcare debt. It was at this time 
that the Zapatero government and the Fiscal and Finance Policy Council decided on 
September 13th, 2005 to approve the tax increases: one cent per liter of beer, thirty cents 
per liter of spirits and 10 cents per pack of tobacco (El Pais Sept. 17th, 2005). This policy 
helped promote parity between states because it permitted them to be able to spend 
money and not have to worry about overhanging deficit. The distribution of the funding, 
however, maintained the scheme of the second Aznar government (legislated in 2002 and 
to last for a duration of at least five years) that weighed every region equally, mostly by 
the basis of population and area (94% and 4.2%, respectively). While this system appears 
to be fair, it does not take into consideration large, populous and wealthy regions, such as 
Catalonia, which would receive funding they do not need over a smaller, poorer 
community, such as Murcia, which needs more funding to bring its infrastructure to the 
level of the high performing regions. Additionally, the distribution scheme excludes 
weighting of income inequality in the formula, which was a component in the previous 
schemes of 1987, 1991 and 1996. This will have to be an area of reform in the future for 
continued increases in parity. 
Later in the year (December), the government passed Law 28/2005, preventing 
various tobacco promotional and vending techniques to lower usage within the 
population (another progressive social policy rather than exclusively parity-inducing). 
After the passage of more progressive health services, such as the May of 2006 Law 
14/2006 regarding technical regulations for assisted human reproduction, the Zapatero 
government passed Royal Decree 1207/2006 in October of 2006 that extended coverage 
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of the Cohesion Fund to other services in healthcare and to change the wording of the law 
so that every citizen would be covered by the Cohesion Fund (060.es 2006a). This 
extension ensures that every region would be ensured of coverage so that deficits would 
not occur on the community level and that expenditures could continue in a relatively 
uninterrupted process to promote parity between regions by the creation of new 
infrastructure, hiring of more doctors, etc.  
The final law of significance for this analysis from the Zapatero government (due 
to the two future legislative measures concerning biomedical investigation and 
medication, areas not related to this study) was Royal Decree 1302/2006, which sought to 
expand the hallmark healthcare parity legislation of the majority Aznar government, Law 
16/2003. The stated objective of the law was to “guarantee the equity in access to 
healthcare that is characterized by quality, efficient and safety to people with certain 
conditions that require specialized attention that are available to a reduced number of 
centers;” the objective later states that the royal decree is to provide a process for the 
development and accreditation of centers to be able to provide better care to underserved 
areas (060.es 2006b). Article four creates a “Committee for the designation of centers, 
services and reference points” that would perform various functions for parity: a) study 
community needs and propose strategies; b) propose the procedure for the designation of 
centers, services and reference points for the NHS; c) propose criteria for the designation 
and accreditation of centers; d) inform communities over the procedure of accreditation; 
e) evaluate solicitations for designation from centers on need-based criteria; f) study and 
propose renovations for centers to keep them state-of-the-art; and g) propose procedures 
for the derivation of system users (060.es 2006b). The legislation closes with financing of 
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the project in article nine. The article states that the Cohesion Fund will finance the 
measures enacted and distribute funding to the regional governments for the explicit use 
of this project (060.es 2006b). 
This legislation is representative of the social platform of the Zapatero PSOE 
government and indicates a strong desire to increase parity between the autonomous 
communities. Royal Decree 1302/2006 explicitly was formulated for parity between 
regions through assistance to underserved, poor performing healthcare regions. While 
most of the policies enacted by the government were social in nature, there seemed to be 
a genuine attempt for regional equity without concerns of cost, while the Aznar 
governments, certainly not averse to parity between regions, displayed a sense of “parity-
for-the-right-price” attitude. The extension of coverage and duties of the Cohesion Fund 
and the 2005 actions to remove healthcare deficits from the autonomous communities 
through taxation and fiscal transfers from the central government to the regional level 
indicate the willingness and attempts to reduce debts so that the communities could spend 
to improve their healthcare systems. The evidence strongly supports that the PSOE 
government led by Zapatero did promote more parity than the PP governments led by 
Aznar.  
The first facts seen from the data point of 2008 (table 4) are the changes in 
regional expenditure. The 30.53% increase in healthcare expenditure per capita is higher 
than the first Aznar government. While it is a lower rate than the second Aznar 
government, the bottom four regions during Zapatero’s 2004-2008 government all 
increased spending over the national average, mostly by large margins, while two of the 
bottom four in the second Aznar government underperformed. More revealing is that the 
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Zapatero government only had two of the poorest nine regions underperforming in 
healthcare expenditure per capita (compared to five under the second Aznar government), 
including now having only one of the poorest four regions (Andalusia) under the national 
average (compared to three of four under Aznar). The other underperforming region of 
the poorest nine in Spain, Valencia, is a case that will be discussed later in the conclusion 
due to influences away from national level politics, especially in light of its 
underperformance in both measures by particularly large amounts (12.11% lower in 
expenditure and 8.63% in change in expenditure). Another interesting fact the data 
reveals is that only two regions that underperformed under the Zapatero government 
changed their expenditure by less than the national average: Valencia and the Balearic 
Islands, which has appeared to be a problem case for each government since 1996. This 
number is compared to four under the first Aznar government and five under the second 
Aznar government. All these numbers indicate a much stronger effort on the part of the 
Zapatero government to promote parity within the Spanish healthcare system. 
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Table 4 
 
Regional 
Statistics in 
2008 
 
 
Regional 
expenditure 
on healthcare 
per capita 
(euros)* 
 
 
% change 2004-
2008 
Balearic Islands 1,154.67 26.28 
Madrid 1,178.84 34.39 
Catalonia 1,274.32 31.19 
Navarre 1,441.80 28.29 
Basque Country 1,542.05 41.26 
La Rioja 1,486.60 39.99 
Aragon 1,392.82 34.43 
Cantabria 1,348.61 14.55 
Valencia 1,126.71 21.90 
Castile-Leon 1,386.61 42.24 
Canary Islands 1,411.23 30.20 
Asturias 1,307.18 20.54 
Murcia 1,302.31 31.10 
Castile-La 
Mancha 1,349.37 47.63 
Galicia 1,374.25 42.08 
Andalusia 1,229.93 33.41 
Extremadura 1,553.82 43.17 
Spain 1,281.92 30.53 
Source: Author’s calculations, MSC 2008, INE website 2008 
*Initial budget figures used since fiscal year 2008 has yet to end 
 
  
 
Results/Discussion 
 The data from the various time points suggest that neither government particularly 
affected the growth and parity between regions. It could also suggest that both 
governments passed legislation that positively affected parity between the regions. In 
fact, the improvement in population per doctor and regional expenditure on healthcare 
per capita were better in the second Aznar government than in the Zapatero government. 
However, these statistics may be slightly misleading. It was established earlier in the 
analysis that the healthcare system was devolved to the various communities for their 
management. Valencia is a case where it is especially important to note this. The 
Community of Valencia has been a bastion of Popular Party support since the municipal 
elections of 1995. Every other community has similar patterns: Andalusia has been a 
PSOE stronghold since the inception of the democracy; Catalonia has been majority 
socialist since 1996; and Extremadura was socialist from 1996-2000 and 2004-2008 
(MIR 2008). This indicates that, during the terms of these three governments, the regions 
used in the study were all socialist, for the exception of a minority PP government in 
Extremadura during Aznar’s second term and Valencia. Social programs from the 
community level should be considered as either a partial or significant cause of the 
improvement or, in the case of Valencia, underperformance in the measures.  
Although this should be taken into consideration, it does not render the results 
void of any merit. Table 5 summarizes the information in Tables 2-4.  The figures in the 
second column are correlations between regional GDP per capita levels in 1996 and the 
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change in healthcare expenditure in each government. Negative numbers indicate 
convergence, or rather, that the poorer regions are increasing healthcare expenditure per 
capita at a higher rate than the wealthier regions.  As the table indicates, the negative 
correlation for the Zapatero government is higher than for either Aznar government, 
suggesting a more successful effort at promoting parity during the PSOE term in office. 
 
Table 5 
Correlation of 1996 regional GDP to change in 
spending 
Correlation of 1996 regional GDP per capita with 
regional change in spending during the 
governmental period 
Aznar government 1996-2000 -0.18 
Aznar government 2000-2004 -0.14 
Zapatero government 2004-2008 -0.22 
Source: Author’s and John Stephens’ calculations  
 
As I have described above in the corresponding sections of each government, 
however, the policies of the Popular Party and Aznar seemed to have hindered regions 
more than they benefited them. The insistence of fiscal policies that restrained spending, 
while benefiting the national economy and growth in other sectors, hindered the process 
of building parity through infrastructure and personnel in the healthcare sector. Although 
the PSOE government of Zapatero did not pass significant amounts of legislation 
dictating explicitly for healthcare parity between regions either, the government of 2004-
2008 showed substantially more willingness to spend finances to allow the regional 
governments to remove themselves from the deficits that plagued them since the 
inception of the healthcare system in Spain. Finally, as well as passing many socially 
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progressive measures for social liberties in the healthcare field (stem cell research, 
abortions, tobacco prevention, etc.), the Zapatero government approved a law that did 
explicitly seek to promote parity between regions through development of care centers 
for specialized needs and rare illnesses. 
It could be argued that Spain has been developing its current healthcare system 
over a general time period of roughly thirty years of democracy; in this light, it is 
understandable why such disparity still exists in such an advanced, industrialized country. 
As discussed throughout the analysis, healthcare has traveled a long path towards parity. 
Through the efforts of the Aznar government and the Zapatero government, equity in the 
Spanish healthcare system seems more approachable every passing year. The future holds 
much promise for this area of social need in the Spanish welfare state, particularly with 
the reelection of the Zapatero government in March of 2008. The government has 
promised to keep promoting equity in all sectors of Spanish society, especially the 
healthcare sector. However, with the recent economic downturn and the extreme concern 
of the Spanish people for this “crisis,” it appears the second Zapatero government will 
have a difficult time fulfilling the potential developed over the past few decades. 
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